Collaborative Filtering Under a Sybil Attack: Analysis of a Privacy Threat by Frey, Davide et al.
Collaborative Filtering Under a Sybil Attack: Analysis
of a Privacy Threat
Davide Frey, Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Antoine Rault
To cite this version:
Davide Frey, Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Antoine Rault. Collaborative Filtering
Under a Sybil Attack: Analysis of a Privacy Threat. Eighth European Workshop on System
Security EuroSec 2015, Apr 2015, Bordeaux, France. EuroSec ’15 Proceedings of the Eighth Eu-
ropean Workshop on System Security, 2015, <http://www.syssec-project.eu/eurosec-2015/>.
<10.1145/2751323.2751328>. <hal-01158723>
HAL Id: hal-01158723
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01158723
Submitted on 2 Jun 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - ShareAlike 4.0 International
License
Collaborative Filtering Under a Sybil Attack:
Analysis of a Privacy Threat
Davide Frey
INRIA Rennes
France
davide.frey@inria.fr
Rachid Guerraoui
EPFL
Switzerland
rachid.guerraoui@epfl.ch
Anne-Marie Kermarrec
INRIA Rennes
France
anne-marie.kermarrec@inria.fr
Antoine Rault
INRIA Rennes
France
antoine.rault@inria.fr
ABSTRACT
Recommenders have become a fundamental tool to navi-
gate the huge amount of information available on the web.
However, their ubiquitous presence comes with the risk of
exposing sensitive user information. This paper explores
this problem in the context of user-based collaborative fil-
tering. We consider an active attacker equipped with exter-
nally available knowledge about the interests of users. The
attacker creates fake identities based on this external knowl-
edge and exploits the recommendations it receives to identify
the items appreciated by a user. Our experiment on a real
data trace shows that while the attack is effective, the inher-
ent similarity between real users may be enough to protect
at least part of their interests.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.3 [Information Systems]: Information Storage And
Retrieval—Information filtering
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recommenders have become ubiquitous in a large number
of online services. Introduced in the early 1990s, to deal with
the information overload brought about by the internet [17],
they quickly spread from initial specialized application such
as the selection of Usenet news [31] to widely available com-
mercial platforms like Amazon.com, which filed a patent for
its recommender service in 1998 [25]. Today, recommenders
span a wide range of websites including social networks [1,
3], news websites [16], and multimedia services [7, 2]; and
they have even been proposed to help patients select the
most suitable physicians [20].
Recommenders collect information about user opinions
through the interactions between users and, most often, the
websites they are deployed on. Such information can take
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an implicit or explicit form. Implicit information includes
for example clicks on links, or the time spent on a web page
or listening to a song. Explicit information includes rat-
ings such as on Netflix and Amazon, comments and reviews,
or application-specific actions such as likes on Facebook, or
retweets on Twitter. In both cases, recommenders collect
this information into user profiles that characterize the in-
terests of users. They then use these profiles to attempt to
predict the tastes of users on items they have not yet been
exposed to.
Two major classes of recommenders exist: content-based,
and collaborative-filtering. The former rely on the charac-
teristics of the items appreciated by users to identify other
items that are susceptible to interest them. The latter ex-
ploit the fact that users that appreciated similar items in
the past will probably appreciate similar items in the fu-
ture. They therefore identify items to recommend among the
items appreciated by similar users. Collaborative-filtering
comprises the vast majority of existing recommendation plat-
forms thanks to its content-agnostic nature. Collaborative-
filtering systems can recommend complex objects for which
accessing and processing content would be difficult. This
gives them the flexibility to operate with highly heteroge-
neous items (for example recommending paintings to a user
based on their literary tastes).
Regardless of the techniques they use, the growing popu-
larity and pervasiveness of recommenders have raised con-
cerns from the research community and from users them-
selves about the threats they pose to user privacy. As the
data exploited by recommenders gets more and more into the
personal sphere, users have started to worry about their data
being collected and concentrated in the data centers of a few
big players, and potentially sold to or stolen by potentially
malicious third parties. This concern for the emergence of
online Big Brothers has prompted not only researchers but
also user communities to design decentralized solutions for
recommenders [14, 11].
However, the threat of a Big Brother is only one of the
risks associated with the use of a recommender. Decentral-
ized solutions replace the Big Brother by a plethora of little
brothers among which it is easy to envision the presence of
ill-intentioned users. But even in centralized ones, recent
research has shown that the very nature of collaborative
recommendation makes it reasonably easy for an attacker
to learn about and monitor the interests of other users sim-
ply by observing publicly available information [13]. In this
paper, we follow the research direction laid out by [13] and
evaluate the impact of an active Sybil attack in which the
attacker attempts to guess the items contained in a target
user’s profile.
Our preliminary results on the MovieLens-100k dataset
highlight a sharp difference with respect to what [13] shows
for passive attacks. The attacker requires a significant amount
of auxiliary knowledge to be successful: knowing 50% of the
target’s ratings only allows the attacker to identify other
items with less than 50% of accuracy.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a recommender based on user-based collab-
orative filtering. As mentioned in Section 1, collaborative-
filtering algorithms are particularly successful due to their
flexibility. In the user-based variant, a collaborative-filtering
system essentially consists of a k-nearest-neighbor (KNN) al-
gorithm that identifies for each user, the set of most similar
other users according to the opinions they expressed on the
items they have been exposed to. In the following, we con-
sider a system in which users rate items with a numerical
score (e.g. 1 to 5). For each user, u, the system collects
the mapping between items and scores in a user-profile data
structure. It then runs a KNN algorithm to identify the
users associated with the most similar user profiles. After
identifying u’s neighbors, the system ranks the items they
have rated—for example through a combination of ratings,
number of neighbors that rated them, and similarity of u
with those neighbors—and recommends to u the top-ranking
ones to which she has not yet been exposed.
We consider an attacker that has the capability to (i) ob-
serve part of the ratings expressed by the target—we refer
to these ratings as auxiliary information—and (ii) create
a number of fake identities (Sybils) with the objective to
extract information from the recommender [13]. We also
assume that the attacker knows the value of k, the size of
neighborhoods in the KNN algorithm, which enables her to
create the right number of Sybils.
Attackers can obtain auxiliary information in several ways
depending on the characteristics of the target recommenda-
tion system. In a system like Amazon.com, the attacker
can use reviews posted by the target as evidence that she
bought this or that item, or posts on social networks such as
“I just bought item X”. In systems like Last.fm, the attacker
may consult publicly available listening histories. In decen-
tralized systems like [11], she may simply exploit the profile
exchanges at the basis of the recommendation algorithm.
How to create fake identities also depends on the system
being attacked. On some websites, it is enough to create
a number of accounts and perform some actions such as
listening to music tracks, or adding reviews. On others,
it may be more complex as creating a profile might involve
purchasing items or other costly actions. For the purpose of
this paper, we assume that the attacker has the means to
give each of its fake identities a profile consisting of the set
of auxiliary items and associated ratings. In case creating
a profile involves costly actions, the attacker may simply
shrink the set of auxiliary items to a manageable number.
If the set of ratings copied by the Sybils is large enough,
the KNN algorithm should give each Sybil a neighborhood
consisting of the target user and the remaining Sybils. The
attacker can then monitor all the recommendations received
by each of the Sybils and assume that all the recommended
items come from the profile of the target.
Although [13] introduced this attack, it did not evaluate
its effectiveness. Its authors only suggest that attacks based
on auxiliary knowledge should be effective as long as the
Sybils have access to O(log(N)) items, N being the number
of users. In the following, we show that this is not the case
with non-binary ratings in the dataset we considered.
3. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
We implemented the Sybil attack described above using
the user-based collaborative-filtering implementation pro-
vided by Mahout 0.9 [4], a machine-learning library devel-
oped by the Apache Foundation. Mahout allows us to con-
centrate on the implementation of the attack, while using
a well-tested implementation of state-of-the-art user-based
collaborative filtering.
To compute the KNN graph, we adopt the well-known
cosine-similarity metric. Like most other recommenders,
Mahout uses a slightly modified version of the similarity
which computes the norms of the two profiles by counting
only the items that are common to both of them.
Cos(u, v) =
u · v
‖uv‖‖vu‖ ,
where xy = {(i, r) ∈ x|∃r′, (i, r′) ∈ y}, and (i, r) refers to an
item and its rating.
We ran our experiments on ML-100k, a dataset consist-
ing of 100,000 movie ratings from the MovieLens [19] online
movie recommender. Each rating consists of an integer value
from 1 to 5, 1 being the worst, and 5 being the best.
We assume that the auxiliary information available to the
attacker consists not only of a list of items, but also of the
associated ratings as expressed by the target. We consider
several percentages of auxiliary items available to the at-
tacker. As discussed in Section 2, these items correspond
to the information generally available in decentralized rec-
ommendation systems [11], but may also be obtained in a
centralized setting if the associated website publishes user
ratings. We observe that this is a fairly strong assumption
on the attacker as in many cases, available information is
much less precise. For example, social network plugins may
publish updates such as “Tom just saw Highlander”, but
without specifying a rating.
Even though the auxiliary knowledge comprises both items
and ratings, we define the attack’s goal as the need to deter-
mine whether the target profile contains a particular item,
with a high-enough rating (≥ 3).
We evaluate the attack according to two families of met-
rics. The first one measures the ability of Sybils to con-
struct the ideal neighborhood to carry out the attack. As
discussed, this consists of the target user plus k − 1 Sybils.
Specifically, we measure (i) the fraction of Sybils that obtain
such an ideal neighborhood, and (ii) the fraction of Sybils
whose neighborhoods contain the target.
The second family of metrics measures instead the success
of the attack itself and consists of yield and accuracy. Yield
simply measures the number of guesses that the attacker can
make thanks to the action of the Sybils. Accuracy measures
instead the fraction of correct guesses.
4. RESULTS
The attack aims at populating the neighborhoods of each
of the Sybil identities with the target user and exactly k −
1 other Sybils. Although this may seem straightforward,
the ability to do so depends on the similarity of the target
with other real users. Our analysis of the ML-100k dataset
highlighted that a very large proportion of users have perfect
or almost perfect homologous users that effectively protect
them from the action of Sybils.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the number of perfectly
similar counterparts for the users in ML-100k.
As described in Section 3, Mahout, like many other rec-
ommender systems, uses a variant of cosine similarity that
only considers the ratings for items that appear in both user
profiles. This means that two users may have a perfect sim-
ilarity (i.e. a similarity of 1) even if their item sets are not
exactly identical. It is enough for them to have expressed
the same ratings on their common items. Figure 1 visualizes
this observation by plotting the distribution of the number
of users that have perfectly similar profiles in the dataset, or
perfectly similar counterparts. The point at (0, 45) means
that only 45 out of 943 users in the dataset are not perfectly
similar to any other user. In the following, we analyze how
this user distribution affects the performance of the Sybil
attack in two scenarios: an attacker targeting a single user,
and multiple parallel attacks targeting a percentage of users.
4.1 Isolated Attack
We start our analysis by evaluating the effectiveness of an
isolated Sybil attack. We consider a neighborhood size of
k = 10, and a “team” of 10 Sybils, each aiming to have a
neighborhood consisting of the target plus the 9 other Sybils.
As expected, the presence of so many mutually similar
users severely limits the performance of the attack. Figure 2
plots the fraction of Sybil identities that obtain exactly the
neighborhood that they were expecting to obtain, as a func-
tion of the number of perfectly similar counterparts of their
target user. Each line corresponds to a different amount
of auxiliary knowledge made available to the attacker, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the target’s profile. The plot
shows that none of the Sybils obtains its ideal neighbor-
hood when attacking users that have at least 2 perfectly
similar counterparts, regardless of the amount of auxiliary
knowledge they have. Moreover, even when attacking users
that have no perfectly similar counterparts, the percentage
of Sybils that get an ideal neighborhood strongly depends
on the amount of available auxiliary knowledge. If a Sybil
knows less than 50% of the ratings in the target profile, then
it basically has no chance to obtain its ideal neighborhood.
While these results seem catastrophic for the Sybil at-
tack, Sybils do not need to have perfect neighborhoods to
extract knowledge about their target. A Sybil that only
has the target and other Sybils in its neighborhood can be
sure that every recommendation it receives correspond to an
item from the target profile. But even if its neighborhood
contains unwanted users, the Sybil can still make reasonable
guesses provided that its neighborhood contains the target.
For this reason, Figure 3 complements the above results by
presenting the fraction of Sybil neighborhoods that contain
the target user. The plot shows that even with 30% of auxil-
iary knowledge, approximately 25% of the Sybils manage to
have the target in their imperfect neighborhoods. This still
allows them to identify potential matches for the target’s
interests even if with lower accuracy.
Figures 4 and 5 conclude our analysis of the isolated at-
tack by presenting the yield and accuracy of the predictions
made by the Sybils. To measure these, we have each Sybil
request 5 recommendations from its neighborhood. This
gives a maximum possible yield of 50—5 recommendations
for each of the 10 Sybils. Figure 4 shows that the attack’s
yield decreases as the number of auxiliary items increases.
This is not surprising, the more the attacker knows about
the target, the fewer recommendations the Sybils can get.
Moreover, for high percentages of auxiliary knowledge, the
yield value increases with the number of perfectly similar
counterparts of the target. This results from the presence of
non-target users in the Sybil’s neighborhoods. This presence
causes the Sybils to receive more recommendations, albeit
not necessarily accurate ones as shown in Figure 5.
As expected, accuracy decreases with the number of per-
fectly similar counterparts of the target. Moreover it is also
roughly proportional to the amount of auxiliary knowledge
available to the attacker. In any case, when auxiliary items
cover 50% of the target’s profile, the attacker only guesses
the target’s missing items with less than 50% of accuracy.
These results highlight a sharp contrast with those of [13]
and [28]. Both papers suggest that, in sparse datasets, a
set of auxiliary items of about log(N), N being the number
of users, should be enough to identify the target. As high-
lighted by Figure 1 and the following, this is clearly not the
case in MovieLens-100k.
4.2 Parallel Attacks Against Multiple Users
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0  1  2  3  4  5
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 n
ei
gh
bo
rh
oo
ds
Nb Perfectly Similar Counterparts
30%
50%
80%
90%
Figure 2: Fraction of Sybils that obtain their ideal
neighborhoods when performing an isolated attack,
for different percentages of auxiliary items.
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Figure 3: Fraction of Sybils whose neighborhoods
contain the target user when performing an isolated
attack for various percentages of auxiliary items.
Next, we evaluate how the performance of the attack varies
in the presence of multiple sets of Sybils targeting multiple
users. Figure 6 depicts the fraction of Sybils that manage to
obtain a perfect neighborhood as a function of the fraction
of auxiliary items with varying numbers of target user: 1
user as in Section 4.1, as well as 25%, 50%, and 100% of the
user. The values in Figure 6 and in all the subsequent figures
refer to the target users without perfectly similar counter-
parts. When attacking multiple users, the attacker deploys
a separate team of k = 10 Sybils for each target.
The plot shows that the fraction of perfect neighborhoods
decreases with the number of simultaneously attacked tar-
gets. By attacking multiple users that possibly overlap in
terms of similarity, different teams of Sybils may interfere
with each other causing neighborhoods to contain Sybils
from other teams instead of the target user.
Figure 7 confirms this reasoning and shows that the frac-
tion of neighborhoods containing the target drastically drops
when moving from 1 to 25% of the user as targets. When
attacking 50% of the user, only a few percents of the Sybils
have the respective targets in their neighborhoods.
Figures 8 and 9 confirm the negative impact of parallel
attacks. Accuracy drops significantly as the number of con-
current attacks increases.
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Figure 4: Yield obtained by the isolated attack for
various percentages of auxiliary items.
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Figure 5: Accuracy obtained by the isolated attack
for various percentages of auxiliary items.
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Figure 6: Fraction of Sybils with perfect neighbor-
hoods with a variable number of targets.
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Figure 7: Fraction of Sybils that have the target
in their neighborhoods with a variable number of
targets.
5. RELATEDWORK
Several authors have recognized the trade-off between ac-
curacy and privacy in recommenders [26, 30, 22]. This has
led to results along two main lines of research: identifying
potential threats and attacks, and improving recommenders
to make them more resilient to such attacks.
5.1 Attacks against Recommenders
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Figure 8: Yield with a variable number of targets.
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Figure 9: Accuracy with a variable number of tar-
gets.
Within the context of attacks, we can distinguish passive
and active ones. In the former, the attacker operates as
a normal user and simply tries to learn information about
other users through legitimate means. In the latter, the
attacker carries out operations that go outside the standard
behavior of a user for example by introducing fake identities
like in the attack of this paper, or fake items.
Within the domain of passive attacks, [13] analyzes how
auxiliary information, obtained from the system itself or
from external sources, makes it possible to extract individ-
ual user preferences from otherwise aggregate information
such as related-item lists or item-covariance matrices. The
authors also introduce the active attack we consider in this
paper, but they do not analyze or evaluate its effectiveness.
BlurMe [33] and [9] present passive attacks that extract
demographic information such as the ethnicity or gender of
users from the ratings of items in a recommender. BlurMe
also proposes an obfuscation mechanism to limit the impact
of such an attack, while [9] also develops an active attack
that maximizes the ability to learn new information by ask-
ing users to rate specific items. Pistis [24] considers an ac-
tive attack similar to the one described in this paper, and
proposes a mechanism that limits its impact by expressing
ratings on privacy-preserving groups of items.
Shilling attacks [18, 32] also adopt the active model but
with a different purpose: biasing the output of the recom-
mender, for example to favor the products of a particular
brand. In the context of user-based systems, [18] shows that
even so-called privacy-preserving collaborative-filtering sys-
tems remain vulnerable to profile injection (shilling) attacks.
In the item-based context, [32] shows that the injection of
specific item profiles (power items) can equally bias the out-
put of the recommender.
5.2 Privacy-Preserving Recommenders
The first attempts to provide privacy-preserving recom-
menders have focused on decentralized solutions. One of
the first papers, [15] exploits homomorphic encryption in
a peer-to-peer environment to compute similarities securely
while eliminating the need for a Big Brother. Other authors,
including some authors of this paper, have instead proposed
anonymization [12], and profile-obfuscation [8] techniques.
In a centralized setting, some authors [6, 29] have proposed
injecting noise into user profiles to build privacy-preserving
data-mining and recommendation algorithms. But these
schemes have turned out to be vulnerable to statistical at-
tacks that filter out the random noise to reconstruct the
missing information [5, 21, 23]. Moreover, all the above so-
lutions concentrate on hiding user profiles. They therefore
remain vulnerable to attacks that combine recommended
items with auxiliary information available through external
sources, like the one we study in this paper.
Systems that apply differential privacy only to neighbor-
hood computation [34] exhibit the same problem. But some
authors have also proposed systems that incorporate ran-
domization and ensure differential privacy when they gener-
ate recommendations [10, 27]. In [10], some of the authors of
this paper demonstrate that their approach can effectively
counteract a Sybil-based censorship attack. However, its ef-
fectiveness against an attacker equipped with external aux-
iliary information remains unclear.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We analyzed the impact of an active Sybil attack on user-
based collaborative-filtering recommenders. Our results show
that while the attack is generally effective, some users re-
ceive natural protection from their inherent similarity with
other users in the system. Our analysis of the MovieLens-
100k dataset shows that a large proportion of users in the
KNN graph are naturally surrounded by other users that
protect them from the action of Sybil identities. This is in
sharp contrast with what is highlighted in [13], namely that
log(N) auxiliary items suffice to identify the target.
Despite our interesting results, this work remains a pre-
liminary effort. We plan to extend our analysis in several
ways. First, we aim to confirm our current results on differ-
ent datasets and on different variants of the recommender.
For example, we used a version of cosine similarity that only
accounts for items that appear in both the profiles being
considered. Counting items that appear only in one of the
profiles might have a negative impact on our results.
Second, we aim at exploring variants of the attack proto-
col. For example, we will study the case of adaptive Sybils.
The effect of users’ inherent similarity is probably even more
important in the evolution of adaptive Sybil neighborhoods.
Finally, we have started varying the nature of the informa-
tion available to the attacker. In many cases, an attacker
won’t have access to the full ratings but will have access
to the set of items. Our initial tests indicate that this less
precise information makes the attack even less effective than
what we show in this paper.
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